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Earlier this year, Xanana Gusmão stepped down as 
prime minster of Timor-Leste, appointing Dr Rui 
Araújo, a well-respected member of the opposition, 
to replace him. The long-awaited change in Timor-
Leste’s political leadership is underpinned by the 
reconciliation between Gusmão and opposition 
leader, Mari Alkatiri, who have both agreed to 
step aside into new roles. These enticing new roles 
ensure their respective control over the country’s 
two largest economic development projects (the 
Oecusse Special Economic Zone and the Tasi Mane 
South Coast Petroleum Development Project). This 
In Brief examines how the change in government 
and the role of these two powerful figures in 
state-driven economic development might affect 
political will to legislate on land issues. It argues 
that the legislative lethargy of the past few years is 
a result of significant political economy factors.
Land rights in Timor-Leste are complex — a 
result of customary land rights, colonial injustice, 
foreign interventions, and conflict-related displace-
ment. Layers of competing land claims have made it 
difficult to find a widely accepted solution to post-
independence land issues. A package of three land 
laws, originally drafted with technical and financial 
support from USAID, has been on the table since 
2008. These laws, which would regularise title to 
land and state expropriation of land, were strongly 
defended by the Gusmão government in parliamen-
tary debates and the media throughout 2009 and 
2010. Despite strong opposition from civil society, 
the laws were approved by a parliamentary majority 
with few amendments on 13 February 2012.
In March 2012, then president Jose Ramos 
Horta exercised his constitutional right of veto and 
sent the laws back to government for reconsidera-
tion. Revised drafts of the laws were reapproved by 
the Council of Ministers in 2013. However, despite 
a government majority in parliament, the laws have 
never been scheduled for debate and the political 
momentum behind them seems to have fallen away 
over the last two years. Rather than being a symp-
tom of the long awaited cabinet reshuffle, a closer 
examination of the political economy of Timor-
Leste’s mega-projects sheds light on the waning of 
political support for the laws.
Historically, the rift between Alkatiri and 
Gusmão runs deep. The recent leadership transi-
tion was possible because Alkatiri and Gusmão 
both agreed to step aside and take on new roles. 
Gusmão has become Minister for Planning and 
Strategic Investment, retaining control of the  
crucial Infrastructure Fund and responsibility for 
the US$1.4 billion Tasi Mane Development Project. 
The Tasi Mane Project includes three hubs of petro-
leum and natural gas development along the south 
coast in Suai, Betano, and Beacu and a 150-kilometre 
highway linking the three sites. Conservative esti-
mates suggest that the first phase of the project, 
the Suai Supply Base, will cost the state more than 
US$781 million — ‘more than five times what the 
entire nation will spend on infrastructure for agri-
culture, education, or water and sanitation’ (La’o 
Hamutuk 16/11/2013). The state will need to alien-
ate over 1,300 hectares of land for the first phase. 
This type of high-cost, land-intensive development 
means that retaining flexibility in state–community 
land dealings rather than legislating to protect land 
rights has become a priority for the state. The first 
phase of the Suai Supply Base has seen the expro-
priation of land using standards of consultation and 
compensation well below those promised in the 
draft expropriation law (Cryan forthcoming 2015). 
Alkatiri was appointed President of the 
Authority of the Special Administrative Region of 
Oecusse,1 and is responsible for the US$1.36 bil-
lion Special Economic Zone (ZEESM).2 Execution 
of the first phase of the ZEESM project requires the 
expropriation of land belonging to approximately 
600 households in order to build an international 
airport, a highway, a four-star hotel, and an elec-
tricity-generation plant. Demarcation and clearing 
of land for the road and construction of the hotel 
at Oeupu have begun. As of March 2015, very lit-
tle had been communicated to affected communi-
ties. Alkatiri and others within the authority have 
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stressed the need for communities to contribute to 
national development by donating their land to the 
project, and have repeatedly stated that communi-
ties will not be paid compensation; rather, all of 
the people of Oecusse will be investors in the pro-
ject (Suara Timor Lorosae 10/3/2015). Alkatiri and 
the mostly FRETILIN party leadership of ZEESM 
are under significant pressure to showcase positive 
results before the 2017 elections.3
Prime Minister Araújo’s position on the laws 
remains unclear. While his inaugural address 
stated that ‘legislating in this area [land issues] is 
vital for internal and external investment’ (Araújo 
16/2/2015), he focused mostly on the economic 
dimensions of land. He has repeated in a number of 
forums that the new government will adhere to the 
Timor-Leste Strategic Development Plan 2011–2030, 
and the recent Budget rectification affirms govern-
ment spending on the mega-projects.
While many FRETILIN members of parliament 
were vocally opposed to the laws during debates, the  
party does not have a clear position on land issues.  
Some scholars (Kingsbury 11/2/2015; Leach 18/2/2015) 
suggest that the new political configuration has 
significantly reduced opposition and accountabil-
ity within the national parliament. Perhaps more 
importantly, with FRETILIN’s credibility depending 
on the success of the Oecusse ZEESM project and 
the need to alienate community land as quickly and 
cheaply as possible, they are now facing many of the 
same land issues that Gusmão is facing in Suai.
Due to the change of government, the land laws 
have to be resubmitted to the Council of Ministers 
before proceeding to parliament for approval. Sev-
eral options are available to the Araújo Government. 
It may forge ahead and approve the laws in their 
current format. This would be likely to upset and 
civil-society groups who have expressed serious con-
cerns over the status of state land and the protection 
of community property. The government may also 
have concerns and perceive the compensation pro-
cesses required by the laws as too onerous. 
Alternatively, the government may shelve the land 
laws and begin a new legislative process. While this 
option could lead to more consultative laws, given the 
looming 2017 elections, competing interest groups, 
and the lack of clarity over who in the new govern-
ment would drive the process, it is likely that this 
would be a lengthy process. A third path may see the 
government delay producing any cohesive land legis-
lation and instead relying on piecemeal decree laws 
(such as Decree Law 36/2014, used to expropriate 
land for the Suai Supply Base case) to transfer cus-
tomary land to the state. Irrespective of which path 
eventuates, it is clear that the expropriation of land 
for state development projects is the driving force of 
land policy and legislative development in Timor-
Leste, and that more attention should focus on the 
protection of community land and local policy needs.
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Endnotes
1  Oecusse is an exclave of Timor-Leste situated 100km 
inside Indonesian West Timor.
2  Zona Espesial Ekonomia Sosial Merkadu.
3  Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente 
(Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor).
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